Executive Summary
In September 2021, the European Union (EU) launched the Indo-Pacific Region (IPR) Strategy, a framework of cooperation between India and the EU, aiming together to promote rules-based international order, maritime security, and multilateral cooperation; to ensure a free, open, inclusive Indo-Pacific region since the region accounts for aspects such as global security, global trade and connectivity, and sustainable development, thus holding significant share in geopolitical competition. India’s vision includes the doctrine of ‘Security and Growth for All in the Region’ (SAGAR), which was introduced in 2015, later updated to ‘Mutual and Holistic Advancement and Growth Across Regions’ (MAHASAGAR) in 2025, and it converges on several levels such as climate governance, supply chain resilience, and regional stability. Despite having strong normative alignment, the partnership faces operational challenges such as limited hard power presence of the EU, strategic ambiguity with China, fragmentation inside the EU between its member states, and implementation gap. To enhance the effectiveness of the India–EU Indo-Pacific engagement, it is crucial to address the above mentioned concerns.
Problem Statement
Despite the shared commitment to a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific," a critical operational gap persists for India and the EU to act as a regional stabilizer against Chinese systemic assertiveness. The gap is threefold:
I. Maritime Security: The absence of a unified architecture makes it impossible for the two to address the problem of ‘grey zone’ tactics and secure the Sea Lines of Communication against coercive maneuvers.
II. Economic Fragmentation: The stalemate in FTA negotiations impedes the creation of ‘de-risked’ supply chains. This makes both economies susceptible to Chinese dominance in key minerals and technology standards, preventing a transition from asymmetrical dependencies.
III. Connectivity Vacuum: The lack of different infrastructure options allows unclear models, like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), to become dominant, which then undermines regional independence.
Why does it matter?
The IPR is a focal point for great power competition making the region essential for both EU and India. For India, the IPR is a vital region to establish maritime security and regional leadership, and for the EU the region is essential for securing trade routes, supply chains, and energy flow.
The European Union’s IPR strategy is similar to the Indian concept, having the same strategic scope of paying adequate attention to East Africa and Small Island States and The Indian Ocean with respect to the Indo-pacific strategy. Africa is Europe’s closest neighbour, and the EU-Africa strategic alliance is most crucial for the bloc in a multipolar world. In India’s strategic vision, the IPR covers the entire vast region including the Indian Ocean, and extends from South Africa to Australia.
The region is surrounded by at least 37 countries, holding more than 60% of the world’s population, but is also crucial for world trade, the economy and security which contribute to more than 60% of world GDP and with 45% percent of the world trade that crosses it. Moreover, around 80% of the goods entering the EU transit through the Indian Ocean, and hence the security of transit routes, freedom of navigation and the rule of law are critical for the grouping.
Located at the geographic heart of the Indo-Pacific’s maritime trade routes, the 10 member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) form the hub of the Indo-Pacific’s commercial connectivity architecture. The EU wishes to engage with ASEAN-led regional architecture, putting ASEAN at the heart of its strategy.
India and EU both need each other as strategic partners for their convergence in interests on Trade and Technology. International companies and their suppliers are relocating their manufacturing hubs from China to India, for which India now has a pivotal role in providing an alternative to reduce the dependence on China. Furthermore, to fulfil India’s goal to become a technology-based manufacturing hub, transform into a greater semiconductor player, it requires the participation of European technology. Europe needs India as a strategic partner to promote this diversification, and digitalisation is rising as a key tool to smooth out this transition towards resilient supply chains.
Evidence/Analysis
The IPR is a focal point for great power competition making the region essential for both EU and India. For India the IPR is a vital region to establish maritime security and regional leadership, and for the EU the region is essential for secure trade routes, supply chains, and energy flow. The EU’s “Global Gateway” initiative complements India's regional outreach, as it offers India an alternative to China’s BRI.
EU-India interests converge over IPR, as there is increased focus on ocean governance, blue economy and climate change. In 2018, the Indian Navy escorted the ship of the World Food Programme to Somalia to support the EU’s ‘Operation Atalanta’.
The Indo-Pacific region generates 60% of global gross domestic product (GDP) and is economically linked to Europe through transregional production networks and supply chains. The goal of securing economic gains by participating in ASEAN-led institutions and developing various trade linkages with countries in the IPR remains the EU’s focus. In 2020, India and ASEAN carried out a comprehensive review of strategic partnerships in various areas. They adopted a new five-year action plan ranging from trade cooperation to maritime security and counterterrorism.
Policy Recommendations
- Strengthen Maritime Security Cooperation; focus on the expansion of joint naval exercises eg. Operation Atalanta, to increase EU presence in the Indian Ocean Region, and expand maritime domain awareness through institutionalisation of India-EU maritime dialogue.
- Enhance Strategic Clarity on China; develop a joint framework that clearly addresses economic dependence and security concerns towards China, aiming to balance engagement with deterrence. Aim to deliver viable alternative to China’s infrastructure model, e.g. The Belt and Road Initiative, to counterbalance Chinese influence.
- Strengthen Maritime Surveillance; the EU shall contribute through satellite-based monitoring systems under its Copernicus Programme and naval intelligence frameworks for effective monitoring in the IPR.
- Align Climate Objectives with Trade Connectivity; aim in aligning climate policies with trade and connectivity policies keeping climate concerns in mind, eg; Address regulatory challenges such as the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM).
Conclusion
The India–EU Indo-Pacific Strategy holds significant promise as a balancing and stabilizing framework in a multipolar world. While normative convergence is strong, the partnership requires greater strategic coherence, resource commitment, and institutional depth to become a meaningful geopolitical force in the Indo-Pacific.
References
European External Action Service. (2021). EU strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific.
https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-indo-pacific-strategy_en
European External Action Service. (2023). EU Indo-Pacific strategy: Joint communication overview (PDF).
https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/2023/EU%20Indo-pacific.pdf
EU-India Council. (2025). India and the European Union in the Indo-Pacific: An ocean of opportunities.
https://eu-india.org/2025/04/26/india-and-the-european-union-in-indo-pacific-an-ocean-of opport unities/
Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore. (n.d.). The EU and India’s Indo-Pacific strategies: A strategic synergy.
https://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/papers/the-eu-and-indias-indo-pacific-strategies-a-strategic-synergy/
Observer Research Foundation. (n.d.). An assessment of the European Union’s Indo-Pacific strategy.
https://www.orfonline.org/research/an-assessment-of-the-european-unions-indo-pacific-strategy
IDRW. (2024). India highlights growing Indo-Pacific role under SAGAR vision in 2024 MEA report.
https://idrw.org/india-highlights-growing-indo-pacific-role-under-sagar-vision-in-2024-mea-report/
Embassy of India, Dili. (n.d.). India’s maritime vision: From SAGAR to Indo-Pacific.
https://www.indembassydili.gov.in/section/articles-commissioned-by-xpd-division/india-s-maritime-vision-from-sagar-to-indo-pacific-to-mahasagar-by-amb-suchitra-durai/
EU-India Council. (2025). India and the EU in the Indo-Pacific.
https://eu-india.org/2025/04/26/india-and-the-european-union-in-indo-pacific-an-ocean-of-opportunities/
Alvear-Garijo, C., & Herrera Pilar, M. (2023, March 15). Europe, India and the Indo-Pacific: An analysis of the EU strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific and the Global Gatewayinitiative. Spain-India Council Foundation.
https://www.spain-india.org/files/documentos/EN-Concept_Paper-Europe_India_the_Indo-Pacific.pdf
Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS). (2019). Europe, Indo-Pacific and South Asia: Discussion papers. National University of Singapore.
https://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Europe-Indo-Pacific-South-Asia-Discussion-Papers-Complete-Report.pdf
Luthra, G. (2021, November 10). Towards an EU-India Indo-Pacific connectivity partnership. Observer Research Foundation.
https://www.orfonline.org/research/towards-an-eu-india-indo-pacific-connectivity-partnership